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INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the numerous measures taken f rom time to time by the Government 
of Pakistan to control imports and encourage exports , tlie count ry ' s balance of 
payments , except in 1950-51 and again in 1972-73, has always remained in the 
deficit . Even the massive devaluation of the rupee in 1972 has not been very helpful 
in easing the balance-of-payments si tuation. The persistence of disequilibrium in the 
balance of payments reflects the fundamenta l nature of the problem and under-
scores the fact that ad hoc policies, though inevitable, cannot lay the founda t ion of 
a lasting solution of Pakistan's balance-of-payments problem. What is the source of 
this problem? It can be argued that the balance of payments will remain in deficit as 
long as the growth rate of GNP exceeds the growth rate that domestic savings can 
sustain. Hence the problem cannot be solved as long as sufficient savings are not 
generated to sustain an acceptable growth rate of GNP. However, we can hope for 
a significant reduct ion in the deficit through expenditure-switching and product ion-
restructuring which will reduce the trade gap to the resource gap. 
The studies prior to publicat ion of this article also analysed the problems relat-
ing to balance of payments , industrialization and growth, but the analysis did not 
take into considerat ion simultaneously balance-of-payments and investment policies. 
The point of depar ture of Professor Naqvi's article under review - "The Balance-of-
Payments Problem and Resource Allocation in Pakistan — A Linear Programming 
Approach" — is that balance-of-payments policies cannot be isolated f rom 
investment policies. The main thrust of the argument is that isolated policies aimed 
at removing the balance-of-payments deficit cannot be very f ru i t fu l because they 
conflict with the op t imum allocation of domest ic resources. When various policy 
measures aimed at removing the balance-of-payments deficit are analysed in this 
perspective, it is not very difficult to unders tand why previous policy measures 
aggravated the balance-of-payments problem instead of alleviating it. The various 
policy measures taken f rom time to t ime, which have concentra ted on restricting 
imports , have increased the profi tabil i ty of the domest ic product ion of the imports 
— even of those the domestic consumpt ion of which was to be restricted. Such 
policies have resulted in a movement of resources f rom efficient 'activities' towards 


The model employed by Professor Naqvi did not take into consideration the 
non-traded activities. It may be noted that a model which does not have a non-
traded activity is recursive in the sense that the composition and level of ou tpu t in 
various activities are determined independently of the level and composit ion of the 
domestic demand. Given the domestic production and the demand, the excess 
demand (supply) spills over to the international market . Therefore, the correct 
balance-of-payments policy is to achieve an optimal investment plan and demand 
management. Though Professor Naqvi pointed out that fiscal and monetary policies 
should be used in conjunction with the exchange rate policy, yet he did not 
explicitly take them into consideration while modelling the economy. The works of 
Professor Hansen and others have modelled simultaneously all the policies 
influencing various 'activities'. 
As soon as non-traded activities are introduced into the model, the system 
ceases to be recursive. Though the composition of international sectors (traded 
activities) is determined independently of the national sectors (non-traded activities), 
yet the level of each activity is constrained by the output of the national sectors. 
It may be noted that the variables associated with the national sectors influence 
directly the exchange rate. Moreover, demand management is also not completely 
independent of the investment allocation when we take into consideration the non-
traded activities. Therefore, in the presence of non-traded activities, we have to 
consider the capacity of national sectors as a constraint which can be eased over time 
through building greater capacity in the national sectors and investment allocation 
and demand management simultaneously by taking into consideration the balance-
of-payments objectives. 
The author 's result of devaluation being the best course under free trade with 
complete specialization was due to the linear programming model employed in the 
study and absence of the non-traded activities in the model. Such models assume 
proportionality in the production scale and an infinite demand for the exports. 
It is also interesting to note that similar results have been derived from various 
studies on effective protection which also implicitly assume constant returns and 
infinite demand. Of course, more trade is better than less trade but only when the 
markets are not distorted. The exceptions to free trade are well known. To the 
extent that demand is not unlimited for exports the linear programming results may 
yield a sub-optimal solution. Of course, the author qualified his results by noting 
the importance of these distortions but since they were not modelled explicitly, one 
does not know whether the composit ion and level of output are liable to be affected 
significantly or not if we took into consideration the factors left out of the model. 
In view of the importance of such studies and their conspicuous absence in the 
Pakistani literature, there is a need of doing similar exercise for recent years, using 
a more disaggregated model which takes care of non-traded activities as well as 
demand management. Moreover, because an input-output table, which provides the 
(iv) 
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The purpose of this study is to examine Pakistan's foreign-trade problems and 
policies in the context of the wider question of a rational allocation of domestic 
resources. It will be argued that measures taken in Pakistan to regulate the flow of 
imports and exports have led to a pattern of resource allocation which may aggravate 
the balance-of-payments problem. 
The difficulty is mainly attr ibutable to the fact that foreign economic policies 
and policy measures taken to regulate the domestic economy have of ten been at 
cross-purposes. For instance, whereas the domestic investment policy has aimed at 
promoting the most economical use of scarce investment resources, the licensing 
system has provided a strong incentive for a wasteful use of these resources by 
encouraging import substi tution even where the country may have a long-run 
comparative disadvantage. While domestic policy has aimed at raising the marginal 
rate of savings, the policy of protecting consumption goods, particularly the non-
essential ones, has tended to liberalize consumption. 
In addition, the attack on the balance-of-payments problem has not covered 
equally the import and export sectors; import-control policies have of ten run counter 
to those designed to deal with the export sector. With the system of import licensing 
started in 1953, government policy concentrated mainly on controlling imports, 
the export sector having been relatively neglected. The Export Bonus Scheme, 
introduced in 1959, was designed to throw a bridge between import and export 
policies, preparing for a coordinated at tack on the balance-of-payments problem. 
Even though it did provide some stimulus to exports, the stimulus to import sub-
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Table 2: 
The Evaluation of Production and 
Production activities 
Commodities and X 1 A X1B x 2 x 3 X 4 M 1 A factors 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Finished products 
A. 1.00 LOO 
B. LOO 
2. Intermediate products - . 3 0 - . 5 0 1.00 
3. Raw material - . 3 0 1.00 
4, Foreign exchange 1.00 - . 9 0 
5. Other inputs - . 5 0 -1 .00 - . 8 0 -2 .00 - 2 . 0 0 
6. Labour -1.50 -1 .50 - 1 . 2 0 - 3 . 0 0 -3 .00 
7. Capital - 1 . 0 0 - 2 . 0 0 - 3 . 0 0 - 5 . 0 0 -3 .00 
Market Profitability 
8. Stage (a) - . 15 -2 .75 -1 .45 -3 .50 -3 .00 0 
9. Stage (b) +6.60 +4.00 -1 .45 - 3 . 5 0 -3 .00 -
10. Stage (c) +6.60 +4.00 -1 .45 - 3 . 5 0 0 0 
11. Stage (d) +4.13 - . 1 3 +3.87 +6.25 +4.50 0 
12. Stage (e) +1.56 - 1 . 7 0 +.68 +.40 0 0 
Cost of Production 
13. Stage (a) __ _ 23,200 
14. Stage (b) 3,000 4,500 15,200 
15. Stage (c) 3,000 4,500 15,200 
16. Stage (d) 3,000 - 6,500 3,900 15,200 
17. Stage (e) 3,000 — 6,500 3,700 7,200 
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Market Model 
Import Activities by Market Prices 
Import activities Market prices 
Stage (b) import Stage (a) restric- Stage (c) Stage (d) Stage (e) Final 
M IB M 2 M 3 O.G.L. tions on v=150% v=150% v=60% demand 1 A and 1 B b=40% b=100% b=100% only 
(7) (8) (9) (10) ( l l )a (12) a (13) a 0 4 ) a (15) 
4.50 11.25 11.25 11.25 7.20 1,000 
1.00 4.50 11.25 11.25 11.25 7.20 1,000 
1.00 5.50 5.50 5.50 13.75 8.80 1,000 
1.00 6.50 6.50 6.50 16.25 10.40 0 
(12.50) b (12.50) b (8.00) b 
- . 9 0 -1 .10 -1 .30 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0 
(8.00) (12.50) (8.00) 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Notes: a) 'v' is the rate of premium and 'b' is the rate of bonus as defined in the text, b) Rs. 5.00 is the official rate of exchange. The figure in parentheses above the official rate is the price of foreign exchange to the importer under bonus-voucher imports, and the figure in parentheses below the official rate is the price received by the exporter. 
Total 
cost 
23,200 
22,700 
22,700 
20,600 
20,600 
0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
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It is now easy to see why in Stage (c), in spite of a bonus of 40 percent and a 
premium of 150 percent, export activity continues to be relatively far less profitable 
than import substitution. The problem of resource allocation also remains unsolved, 
for the bias against the home production of 2 and 3 could be eliminated only if they, 
like 1A and l f i , were also imported on a 150-percent premium. Obviously, the true 
relative profitabilities of activities X 1 A through X3 can be ascertained only if all of 
them are equally protected. 
This completes our analysis of the existing situation. Our model was, as a 
matter of fact, primarily designed to do precisely this. It is, however, instructive to 
see how the solution of this model can be made to correspond to that we obtained 
in our reference model. Such an attempt will be fruitful in two ways: i) it will 
illustrate the way market prices can do the same job that shadow prices are supposed 
to do; it) if the main implication of our analysis — that the rate of exchange should 
reflect the real opportunity cost of producing it at the margin of the export sector — 
is accepted, then such an attempt will also indicate the direction that exchange-rate 
policy might take to achieve an equilibrium solution. 
Stage (d) 
We, therefore, pass on to Stage (d). We put b = 100. Also we now import all 
the commodities 1A to 3 on bonus vouchers (at v = 150 percent). (The reasons for 
both of these changes have already been given in Stage (c).) 
The export activity ( X 4 ) now becomes highly profitable (perhaps too 
profitable). Secondly, it has become profitable also to undertake activities X2 and 
Xj . Thirdly, activity X J B , where we did not have any real comparative advantage, 
attracts investment no more as its market profitability has become negative. It is 
now more profitable to import it. Fourthly, the aggregate cost of production is 
lowered substantially from 22,700 to 20,600. 
We can, therefore, see that by making b = 100 and by putting all the 
commodities on the bonus list we eliminate at once the market bias against exports 
and against producing capital goods, spare parts and raw materials. Also, the market 
incentives cause investment to flow only into industries where we enjoy a real 
comparative advantage ( X 1 A ) and not into those where no such advantage exists 
0 W -
Although, we have here the necessary conditions of an equilibrium solution, 
these are by no means sufficient. Our "solution" still suffers from the defect that all 
except 1B earn substantial excess profits. This might lead to an excess of investment 
in import substitution and export expansion, leading to a balance-of-payments 
surplus. Such a situation implies that v is too high. Now v will, other things being 
equal, decline as b is increased to 100 percent. With b = 100, a high v will, by 
providing a greater encouragement to exports, increase the supply of bonus vouchers, 
which, in turn, will tend to depress v. On the other hand, an increase also in bonus-
voucher import list (i.e. as goods 2 and 3 are added to the list) would, other things 
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being equal, tend to raise v. We, however, assume that this influence is swamped 
by the effect of the increased supply of bonus vouchers. 
Stage (e) 
With these considerations in mind, we pass on to Stage (e). As b is increased 
from 40 percent (in Stage (c)) to 100 percent (in Stage (e)) we assume that v falls 
from 150 percent to 60 percent. A look at the matrix (Table in the Appendix) 
will show that, with this change, while the incentive to exports would be the same 
as before, that to import substitution will weaken considerably. Relatively speaking, 
the new combination of b and v provides a greater incentive to exports. As a result, 
the excess profits earned in X 1 A , X2 and X3 are reduced to more modest 
proportions; while the unprofitability of X 1 B gets more pronounced. 
In a true optimum situation, however, the profitability of undertaking 
activities X 1 A , X2 and X 3 , must also be zero. What is required to obtain a complete 
solution is to equate not only the marginal revenue from producing one unit of 
exports ( X 4 ) with the marginal cost of producing it, but also to equate the marginal 
revenue from import substitution to its marginal cost. Here, in this model, we have 
met only condition (1). To meet condtion (2), the market prices of all the commo-
dities would have to equal their real opportunity costs. However, we need not carry 
this market model further since the basic principles are illustrated clearly enough. 
V 
The picture depicted in Stage (e) indicates certain guidelines for government 
policy designed to influence market forces to operate rationally and consistently. 
It tells us what direction the exchange-rate policy might take to solve the balance-
of-payments problem. However, to repeat, this does not suggest that an appropriate 
exchange-rate policy is sufficient to do the job. Fiscal and monetary policies, import 
controls and direct subsidies may be as effective as exchang-rate policy. As a matter 
of fact, our argument presumes that monetary and fiscal policies are also consistent 
with the objectives achieved in our model by exchange-rate policy. However, as 
pointed out in the introductory part of this paper, our model is designed to help 
trace the repercussions of changes in the exchange rate only. Furthermore, a linear-
programming model cannot comprehend relationships which cannot be expressed 
quantitatively. But our model does show that if price incentives are to be used as 
a guide to resource allocation, the exchange-rate policy must be such as removes 
biases in the market; and it can accomplish this task, within a free-market setting, 
only if the price of foreign exchange is made equal to its true opportunity cost. 
We have noted that the licensing system provided a hidden 'subsidy' to the importer 
and imposed a 'penalty' on the exporter. The system was, thus, biased against 
export expansion and in favour of import substitution. Furthermore, by giving 
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"greater protection to finished goods than to intermediate goods or capital 
equipment, it encouraged investment in the former rather than in the latter" [7]. 
The Export Bonus Scheme was introduced to promote exports (to allow greater 
imports) and relied on the market for subsidizing exporters. We have, however, 
noticed that the incentive pattern set up by the Scheme tends to perpetuate the 
biases of the previous system. It provides greater incentive to import substitution 
than to export expansion. Furthermore, by affording discriminatory protection to 
finished consumer-goods industries, it also perpetuates the other bias that we noted 
above. Both the licensing system and the Export Bonus Scheme, thus, create 
incentives which make it difficult for the government to prevent a distorted pattern 
of investment that may be inconsistent with progress towards balance-of-payments 
equilibrium. 
VI 
In this section we note certain other qualifications to our analysis. 
i) The argument that free-market forces corrected for biases may be permitted 
to regulate the choice between import substitution of consumption, of capital, or 
of intermediate goods on the one hand, and exports on the other, depends crucially 
on the condition that fiscal and monetary policies (and wage-profit factors etc.) 
enforce the planned marginal saving rate from the demand side to match this type of 
investment pattern. If this condition does not hold, we may have to 'rig' the 
investment pattern itself in such a way that it can generate the required marginal rate 
of saving. What this implies in terms of our market model is that prices are such as 
give greater protection to activities X 2 , X 3 , and X 4 than to Xj A, thereby making it 
more profitable to undertake the former set of activities than the latter one. It is 
a clear departure from our solution which 'calls for' equalizing marginal 
profitabilities throughout the economy. Yet it is a possible line of action that must 
be noted. 
ii) Our analysis suggests that the bonus rate be raised (perhaps gradually) to 
100 percent on all exports. Now this may not be desirable, since for many exports 
the elasticity of world demand may be less than infinity. In the case of such exports, 
the rate of bonus should be less than 100 percent. It may have to be zero or even 
negative (which means an export tax) in certain cases. Any such step must, however, 
take into account the domestic structure of competition. If there is domestic 
monopoly in respect of certain exports, no departure from the model is needed, since 
the decisions of the monopolist should be based on marginal revenue (MR) rather 
than on price. However, if competitive conditions prevail, the exporters' decisions 
will be based on price (P = MR under these conditions) and considerations relating to 
world price-elasticity of demand become highly relevant. However, it may not be 
advisable to make too many exceptions to the general premium for export (i.e. b). 
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iii) Our model also suggests that all imports should be made against import bonus 
vouchers only. One may ask what about public-sector imports? Should the 
government also be required to pay the penalty rate? The answer is in the 
affirmative. In order to ensure rationality in investment planning in the public sector 
even for imports whose social profitability is not usually decided by economic 
considerations (such as defence imports), there would be some advantage in allowing 
the economic calculus to determine lines where home production could profitably 
substitute for imports. 
iv) There is yet another respect in which slight modifications in our model may 
seem called for. We have assumed that the opportunity cost of labour is equal 
to its market price throughout the economy. The rate of exchange (in terms of our 
model) should, therefore, be manipulated also to correct this bias (against the 
employment of labour). Lary [6], has suggested a dual rate of exchange: one for 
manufactured-goods exports and the other for agriculture, the rate (in terms of 
domestic currency) being higher for the former than for the latter. Such a policy, 
however, may turn out to be of limited usefulness, for the policy of making labour 
(money) costs equal to their real opportunity-cost has direct implications also for the 
choice of techniques in production. While manipulating the rate of exchange may 
help to correct the bias against domestic manufacture, it will have no impact on the 
choice of techniques. A direct subsidy given on the employment of labour may 
achieve this result more effectively. We are, however, not concerned with the details 
of any such proposal. What this means is that the situation in our model, which 
takes the rate of exchange as the key variable, must be supplemented by the use of 
other shadow prices where applicable. 
v) Again, some further correction must be undertaken in the case of industries in 
which economies of scale are important. A higher bonus for exports might be given 
in these cases. Again, however, a direct subsidy may also be employed if it is 
desirable to avoid making exceptions to the bonus rule. 
/ 
vi) In our model, we could not take account of the problems arising from the 
rather sharp fluctuations in the level of premium on bonus vouchers. Such a system 
suffers from all the defects associated with a system of fluctuating exchange rates. 
It impedes long-term investment planning of productive activities in respect of both 
import substitution and exports. It follows that some scheme for stabilizing v must 
be devised. This, however, falls outside the scope of this paper. 
VII 
' We can be very brief in our conclusions. Our 'reference model' showed quanti-
tatively the complex nature of the balance-of-payments problem: an optimum 
pattern of trade is determined simultaneously with an optimum allocation of 
domestic resources. It also highlighted the crucial role that a correct foreign-
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exchange price plays in bringing the two magnitudes into approximate balance. 
More importantly, the model served as a springboard from where we could proceed 
to a more concrete (though still hypothetical) 'market model'. This market model 
enabled us explicitly to analyse the Pakistan balance-of-payments problem and to 
show the inadequacy of the various policies taken to deal with this problem. The 
model also provides broad guidelines for a rational exchange-rate policy. It tells us 
explicitly that the exchange-rate policy must be so manipulated as to make the 
official price of foreign exchange equal to its true opportunity-cost — defined as the 
cost of producing (or earning) a unit of foreign exchange at the margin of the export 
sector. The limited nature of our solution has, however, been noted. Our model 
does not imply the sufficiency of exchange-rate policy to deal with the balance-
of-payments problem in its full complexity. Supplementary fiscal and monetary 
policies must also be taken. It also does not say that a market solution, such as we 
have proposed, is the best solution. All it tells us is that if free-market forces are to 
be used, then, within the conditions specified in the model, the exchange-rate policy 
will have to follow the lines indicated in our market model. 
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